We propose a novel empirical strategy for identifying and studying nationalism using name choices. We …rst show that having been given a …rst name that is synonymous with the leader(s) of the fascist Croatian state during World War II predicts volunteering for army service in the 1991-1995 Croatian war of independence and dying during the con ‡ict. Next, we use the universe of Croatian birth certi…cates and the information about nationalism conveyed by …rst names to contrast the evolution of nationalism and its intergenerational transmission across locations a¤ected by extreme war-related experiences. Our evidence suggests that in ex-Yugoslav Croatia, nationalism was on a continuous rise starting in the 1970s, that its rise was curbed in areas where concentration camps were located during WWII, and that nationalist fathers consider the nationalism-transmission trade-o¤ between within-family and society-wide transmission channels suggested by Bisin and Verdier (2001) .
Introduction
During WWII, Croatia was ruled by the Ustaše movement, which blended fascism, Roman Catholicism, and Croatian nationalism. The military wing of the movement became the army of the Croatian fascist state and its Ustaše government enacted race laws patterned after those of the Third Reich. It established concentration camps in Croatia and members of the movement murdered hundreds of thousands of primarily Serbs, Jews and Roma.
The movement was founded and led (until its dissolution in 1945) by Ante Pavelić, who also acted as dictator during WWII. The name Ante thus has similar connotations in Croatia as Adolf has in Germany. Unlike Adolf in Germany, however, the name is in continued use, as are names of other leading Ustaše generals and politicians. 1 The use of these names ebbed after WWII, but they gained in popularity in the late 20th century as Croatian nationalist sentiments were on the rise.
In this paper, we study the 1991-1995 Croatian war of independence, one of Europe's deadliest con ‡icts since World War II, and show that men whose …rst names are synonymous with the notorious leader(s) of the Ustaše movement, i.e., with the WWII history of the fascist, …rst modern independent Croatian state, were more likely to volunteer to …ght in the Croatian army and that they were more likely to die during the full-scale armed con ‡ict between Serbs and Croats. The analysis, based on the complete registry of almost half a million veterans of the War of Independence, links two con ‡icts between neighboring nations and implies that having a 'nationalist'name predicts nationalistic behavior in war, presumably due to values transmitted from parents. century Croatian politician and writer who is considered to be one of the founders of Croatian nationalism.
The rise in the popularity of nationalist names starting in the 1970s thus foreshadows the War of Independence. Using the universe of over 3 million Croatian male birth certi…cates from 1930 to 2000, we show that the rise is curbed around the locations of concentration camps operated by the Ustaše during WWII, i.e., places where atrocities were committed by the Ustaše movement. We also show that the use of the name Ante for newborns reaches WWII levels in locations that experienced high combat exposure during the Croatian-Serbian 1991-1995 war and spikes dramatically in locations a¤ected by extended enemy siege or occupation after the siege (occupation) ended in 1995. 3 We thus demonstrate that …rst names can contain an informative signal about one's nationalism, a signal that correlates with extreme war experiences and that predicts behavior in a life altering situation-in a war for national independence. This allows us to use name choices to study the spread of nationalism. While we study 20th-century Croatian nationalism, our approach to approximating the regional evolution of political values is applicable in other countries that feature a sharply divided ethnic mix, in federative countries, and in settings where leader's names (or the symbolic names of historical …gures) are notoriously associated with their actions and political beliefs. Given the existence of birth certi…cate records in most countries, our approach allows one to explore many historical settings.
Next, we use the birth certi…cate data to illustrate the usefulness of our approach for the study of intergenerational transmission of nationalism. We focus on name choices made during the War of Independence when the use of nationalist names peaked. For fathers with nationalist names, we …nd evidence consistent with the presence of purposeful transmission of nationalism, as suggested by the Bisin and Verdier (2001) model. In a subset of the analysis, we ask whether veterans of the 1991-1995 war who experienced more carnage in their units during the war are more likely to give their sons nationalist names.
This is an important application as intergenerational transmission of identity and of political and cultural values a¤ects political outcomes, economic development, inter-group and inter-national tensions, and cross-border migration outcomes (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Guiso et al., 2006; Montgomery, 2010; Voigtländer and Voth, 2015) . Survey data now o¤er direct measures of political values and attitudes across recent generations (Albanese et al., 2014; Dohmen et al., 2012; Dhar et al., 2016; Ojedaa and Hatemi, 2015) . However, the dearth of historical data with which one could connect such values across generations implies that much of the work on intergenerational links focuses on easily measured traits such as education (Currie and Moretti, 2003) , welfare dependence (Dahl et al., 2014) , and occupational choice (Dal Bó et al., 2009 ). The research on socioeconomic mobility deals with the lack of historical data by utilizing the fact that surnames provide a signal about one's socioeconomic standing (Clark, 2014; Güell et al., 2015) . 4 In a recent analysis, Olivetti and Paserman (2015) use information about socioeconomic status conveyed by …rst names to measure historical intergenerational socioeconomic mobility in the US.
In comparison, our approach is to use …rst names for the measurement of political values.
In the Croatian case, and possibly more generally during the decades when six distinct nations shared the Yugoslav federation, names carried an informative signal, accumulated through history, geography, and ethnic identity, about their owners'nationalist values. The values we measure using names are related to key events in the modern history of Croatia. 5 The signal we observe is strong enough to allow us to explore factors that correlate with the spread (or lack thereof) of such values and to shed light on their intergenerational transmission.
4 Surnames have also recently been used to study population structure (Novotný and Cheshire, 2012) , to explore the persistence of political attitudes (Ochsner and Roesel, 2016) , to characterize cultural regions (Mateos, 2014) , and to understand voting patterns (Borja et al., 2016) .
5 It is not clear how strongly these values may mix nationalism with right-wing political values (Hedl, 2005) . We certainly do not mean to imply that volunteering for the war for independence is equivalent to holding fascist views. We would also like to stress that while we focus on names linked to the fascist history of Croatia, left-wing and, indeed, anti-fascist forces have always been strong in Croatia. The Yugoslav Partisan movement during WWII, which in Croatia included disproportionate shares of Serbian …ghters and leaders, is often considered Europe's most e¤ective anti-Nazi resistance movement. Anti-fascist Croatians were among the victims of the Ustaše dictatorship.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis is related to several literatures. First, our exploration of the use of names synonymous with a fascist dictatorship is related to work on persistence of political attitudes Voth, 2013, 2015; Fouka and Voth, 2013) and to the literature suggesting that wars and changes in state structures have dramatic consequences for political or ethnic identity (e.g., Mayhew, 2004; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Petersen, 2012; Fontana et al., 2016, Ochsner and Roesel, 2016) . 6 Our measurement of WWII-linked nationalism in former
Yugoslavia is related to the political science of ethnic con ‡icts (Petersen, 2002) , speci…cally to the notion that such con ‡icts often stem from the accumulation of protracted tensions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) .
Second, the intergenerational transmission of political party identi…cation is an extensively researched topic in political sociology (Ojedaa and Hatemi, 2015) and at least two recent studies imply that right-wing attitudes are strongly transmitted within families over generations (Avdeenko and Siedler, in press; Ochsner and Roesel, 2016) . There is also a growing, largely theoretical literature in economics on the intergenerational transmission of values and preferences (Akerlo¤ and Kranton, 2000; Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Becker et al., 2016; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2015) . In the most closely related work to ours, Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) uncover signi…cant intergenerational transmission of war service, but not of military service in peacetime, in US families. Their evidence is consistent with cultural transmission of war service from fathers to sons, as opposed to corresponding to occupational choice transmission or economic incentives. Similar to Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) , our analysis is also related to the issue of whether living memory of a previous war helps countries overcome the collective action problem of getting citizens 6 As Yugoslavia did not run free multi-party elections, we are not able to study voting behavior after WWII, unlike Fontana et al. (2016) , who link German occupation in Italy during WWII to post-war voting patterns, or Ochsner and Roesel (2016) , who uncover long-lasting consequences of WWII-related events on voting patterns in Austria. Glaurdić and Vuković (2016) relate post-1995 voting patterns in Croatia to the 1991-1995 war experience.
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to volunteer for military service in wartime.
Third, our work is closely linked to the exploration of the information content of names and to the literature on child name choices. Sociologists have long recognized that the choice of …rst names is an expression of cultural or religious identity (Disdier et al., 2011; Hacker, 1999; Haan, 2005; Lieberson, 2000; Twenge et al., 2016) . A growing set of studies shows that one's name a¤ects how one is treated by others in schools (Figlio, 2005) , labor markets (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Biavaschi et al., 2013; Rubinstein and Brenner, 2014) , and …nancial markets (Kumar et al., in press ). 7 Such evidence can correspond to preference-based or statistical discrimination; under the latter, one's name may identify one's ethnic identity, and it may also signal one's unobservable characteristics within ethnic groups, presumably because the formation of productivity (or, in our case, political identity)
in childhood is correlated with name choices through parental decisions. In this regard, our …ndings resemble those of Fryer and Levitt (2004) , who suggest that the surge in distinctively Black names in the US since the seventies corresponds to a rise in Black cultural identity.
Why do parents give names to their children that may cause discriminatory treatment? If utility depends directly on identity (group membership), as in Akerlo¤ and Kranton (2000) and Bisin and Verdier (2001) , parents may aim to maximize their children's well-being by giving them group-speci…c names. Algan et al. (2013) consider this trade-o¤ while studying the transmission of Arabic versus Non-Arabic …rst names in France; they show that this transmission is a¤ected by the local-labor-market economic costs of having an Arabic …rst name. In comparison, we study behavioral correlates of name choices outside of the labor market and ask about location-speci…c factors determining the intergenerational transmission of one's political, as opposed to ethnic, identity.
The entire literature on name choices, our study included, is unable to decompose the 7 There is also a growing body of work on reputation e¤ects of corporate names (Wu, 2010; Green and Jame, 2013; McDevitt, 2014) . In related research, Benos and Jochec (2013) show that …rms whose name contains the words "America(n)" or "USA" earn abnormal stock returns during the periods when the U.S.
is engaged in a war (except during the Vietnam war).
6 predictive power of names into the part corresponding to one's upbringing (values inculcated by parents) and the part corresponding to the potential impact of society's or one's own expectations about the identity of a person with a certain name, to the extent that such e¤ects are plausible. 8 Our analysis asks whether name attributes predict the behavior of their owners in a life-altering situation; we assume that the extreme choices we study primarily re ‡ect parental in ‡uence over one's identity. In this sense, our approach is similar to the exploration of the correlates of racial attributes of …rst names in the US, where Aura and Hess (2010) show that name features predict education, happiness, and early fertility, and
where Cook et al. (2015) suggest that they are related to mortality. people were killed in the war, most of them civilians.
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Our analysis of behavior during the war is based on the complete registry of military 8 Nelson and Simmons (2007) and Knewtson and Sias (2010) study the hypothesis that names have a direct e¤ect on behavior through their symbolic linguistic properties. The evidence on implicit egotism, the notion that employer or occupational choices are in ‡uenced by name similarity, is mixed (Simonsohn, 2011) .
9 Although the con ‡ict began as a war for independence, the violence in Yugoslav wars often involved attempts to create ethnically "pure" states and was waged primarily against civilians (Naimark, 2001 As of the start of the war, Croatia had no regular army since the JNA was under Serbian control. The Croatian army was thus initially formed from volunteers and grew in size 10 We exclude from the analysis the 5% of female soldiers who all served in non-combat support jobs.
11 In total, 9,378 soldiers died during the war, 7,747 in active duty. For 7,346 of these, we observe the cause of death. 77% were killed in action as opposed to dying in an accident or of natural causes. We do not observe the cause of death for 401 soldiers who died while in active duty and we assume they were also killed in action.
8 signi…cantly in late 1991, when a draft process began based on the registry of Croatian nationals who had served earlier in the JNA. 12 Figure 1 shows the evolution of the size of the Croatian army and of its volunteer/draftee composition. 13 In total, there were 162,267 male volunteers serving during the war and 317,825 draftees. .015
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Monthly KIA Death Rates 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Draftees Volunteers Figure 2 shows the evolution of monthly death rates-the ratio of soldiers dying in a given month to the number of active-duty soldiers as of the start of the month-separately for volunteers and draftees. The war was at its deadliest in the fall of 1991 (55% of KIA 12 The Croatian Act of Defense made military service mandatory for all male reservists aged 18 to 65.
Failure to respond to the draft call resulted in prosecution and imprisonment. Exemptions from service were possible on health grounds, but the medical checks were strict and exemptions seldom granted (UN, 1995 14 Second, volunteers joined the army earlier and served longer; at a given point in time, they are thus more likely to serve in higher ranks than draftees. Unfortunately, our data does not include rank and this complicates the analysis of KIA death determinants as rank is generally negatively correlated with the chances of dying in a war.
Importantly for our analysis, we observe soldier's place of birth. As of 2015, Croatia, a country of over 4 million, consisted of 21 administrative districts (' µ zupanije'), 555 cities and municipalities ('općine i gradovi'), and 6,750 settlements ('naselje'). Most of the …ghting during 1991-1995 occurred in the 10 districts located along Croatia's eastern border. Correspondingly, the settlements of Croatia were a¤ected by the war in a most uneven fashion.
Part of our analysis is based on merging the veterans registry with settlement-level data from the 1991 Croatian census based on the soldiers' place of birth. In particular, a set of 177 settlements was directly exposed to extensive combat or was under extended occupation by the JNA during the war. Hereafter we refer to these locations as the 'siege settlements'.
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Finally, we note that as of the start of hostilities, Croatia included a large Serbian minority. Based on the 1991 Census, 78% of Croatia's inhabitants were Croats, 12% were Serbs, 1% were Muslims, and 9% belonged to other nationalities. We do not observe soldiers' nationality, but infer nationality from names, as detailed in the next section.
Nationalist Names
Our …rst task is to classify the …rst (male one-word) names appearing in the veteran register.
We are chie ‡y concerned with studying names linked to the Ustaše movement. sub-population, up from 33% in the universe of veterans) and the risks of KIA deaths (at 1.28%, up from 1.26%).
We are now ready to de…ne nationalist names using the link between nationalism and the Ustaše movement. The prime name corresponding to the movement is, of course, Ante, the …rst name of the Ustaše founder Ante Pavelić. In addition, we code a 'Nationalist name' indicator corresponding to the …rst names of the 22 leading Ustaše politicians and generals who received the most important Nazi decoration during WWII-the Knighthood of the Independent State of Croatia. 19 Further, we include in the 'Nationalist name'indicator a set of 4 additional names of the Ustaše leaders who were chie ‡y responsible for the Holocaust in Croatia during WWII. 20 Our purpose is to form a su¢ ciently wide group of names related to the WWII Croatian state so as to support (or reject) the interpretation that we attach to the primary Ustaše name Ante. But this approach leads us to include in the 'Nationalist name'
indicator also names that have strong non-Ustaše nationalist connotations. 21 We expect the sign of the e¤ects of the two mutually exclusive indicators ('Ante'and 'Nationalist name') to be the same. 13 by over a half, then rebounds during the 1980s, which may suggest Croatian nationalism was increasing long before the breakup of Yugoslavia. 22 This pattern is consistent with the use of these names corresponding to nationalist sentiments. 23 We test this hypothesis in the next section.
5 Names and Behavior in War
Volunteering
Our …rst question is whether there are nationalist-name patterns in the volunteering behavior of Croat males in 1991 and 1992. The goal is to estimate such patterns without data on nonactive reservists, i.e. without a direct sample of the population at risk of volunteering.
As documented in Figure 1 , volunteering choices were largely made before the draft process started in earnest. Given that the draft was name-blind, 24 the draftees approximate a random sample of the reservist population after volunteering choices were made, so that our data on volunteers and draftees represent a choice-based sample. Because unobservables a¤ecting the choice to volunteer directly a¤ect the sampling probability, which is thus not independent of the dependent variable conditional on the explanatory variables, consistency requires that we weight the criterion function to be minimized by the inverse probability of selection (Wooldridge, 1999) , which in our case corresponds to 1 for volunteers and to the cohort- 22 Croatian nationalism remained dormant until the 'Croatian Spring'movement of the early 1970s, which called for more rights for Croatia within Yugoslavia, and which was suppressed by force (Motyl, 2001) . 23 Other names have their own popularity 'waves'. In the Appendix Figure 7 , we contrast the evolution of popularity of all male top-10 names in the population according to the 2001 census. Only the 3 names we refer to as nationalist (Ante, Ivan, and Josip) peak both during WWII and during the 1991-1995 war. 24 The draft procedure did not involve names in any explicit fashion. We con…rm that the draft was nameblind by combining the birth certi…cate data with the veteran data: being named Ante or having another
Ustaše name does not predict the name-cohort-speci…c draft rate; the e¤ect is close to zero and precisely estimated.
14 speci…c draft rates for draftees. The …rst column of Table 1 shows the estimated coe¢ cients from a parsimonious volunteering linear probability model controlling for only the step function in age and for the two Next, we perform a number of robustness checks. 29 In column (3), we replicate the speci…cation from column (2) after excluding the large unit of Civil Defense, which has a high share of volunteers, but low risks of KIA death. Doing so does not a¤ect the key estimated coe¢ cients. In column (4) (2), except that the top-10-name coe¢ cient is no longer statistically signi…cant.
So far, our estimates imply that the e¤ect of being named Ante on volunteering is quantitatively comparable to the e¤ect on volunteering generated by one's birth place being under enemy siege and that the broader group of other nationalist names also has a signi…cant, 29 In addition to robustness checks reported in this paragraph, we also estimated the speci…cation from column (2) without the choice-based-sample weights and the estimates were not materially a¤ected. Next, we compared the OLS coe¢ cients reported here to probability derivatives corresponding to a Probit model.
Again, the results were identical for all practical purposes. These results are available upon request. 30 In this speci…cation, we …nd that compared to the base case of having a Croatian name, having a Serbian or a Muslim name lowers volunteering probability by 4 and 9 percentage points, respectively.
albeit smaller e¤ect on volunteering. Finally, in column (6) we ask whether the e¤ects of being Ante and of having another nationalist name di¤ers for soldiers coming from settlements that are under enemy siege. The interaction-coe¢ cient estimates suggest that being named Ante predicts volunteering particularly strongly in areas that were most exposed to the war for independence. It may be that the nationalist implications of being raised as an Ante are particularly strongly activated under direct threat of war. In settlements under enemy siege, Antes are over 12 percentage points more likely to volunteer than other Croats.
This is a large e¤ect considering that the overall volunteering rate was about 12 percent.
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In sum, the evidence on volunteering for war service is consistent with Antes having strong nationalist sentiments.
KIA Risks
In this section, we ask whether having a nationalist name predicts being killed in action (KIA) during the War of Independence for soldiers involved in combat situations. We ask this question to check (refute or fortify) the interpretation that the volunteering analysis of the previous section o¤ers: that being called Ante correlates with nationalist values (inculcated by one's parents). We face a major obstacle in the KIA analysis: the lack of soldier rank information. In any war, higher-ranked soldiers are less likely to die. The rank issue may be particularly important for volunteers who joined the army …rst and who may be particularly skilled soldiers. At a given point in time, volunteers are thus more likely to serve in higher ranks than draftees. Long-serving draftees are also likely to serve in higher ranks. We therefore minimize these issues by focusing on draftees and their KIA risk during 1991.
Draftees during the …rst six months of the war are the group least likely to serve in higher ranks, and it is also the group facing by far the highest death rates (see Figure 2 ).
More speci…cally, for the purpose of the KIA analysis, we …rst omit soldiers who were never in combat. This excludes the entire (40-thousand-strong) Civil Defense unit of the Croatian army, and under 3% of the rest of the army. Within this subset, 1.1% of draftees and 1.6% of volunteers are KIA. Next, we omit all volunteers and also those draftees entering service after December 1991. We only consider KIA deaths occurring during 1991. As a result, we are left with 72,586 draftees with Croatian …rst names, a group of which 1.9% is KIA during 1991. The results are presented in Table 2 , which is structured similarly to Table 1 . The only di¤erence via-à-vis the speci…cations used in Table 1 is that we always condition on a set of 6 …xed e¤ects corresponding to the month of army entry (during 1991) in order to minimize the e¤ect of rank di¤erences, to the extent these are correlated with the length of service, and also, more fundamentally, in order to control for the length of KIA risk exposure.
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The basic sets of estimates in column (1) and (2) are fully consistent with the volunteering e¤ects estimated in the previous section. Antes and, to a lesser extent also those with other nationalist names, are more likely to be killed in action during the …rst six months of the war, when the war was at is deadliest. Compared to the average KIA death rate for early draftees (0.019), the Ante coe¢ cient in column (2) increases KIA risks by about a half. The e¤ect of being from a 'siege settlement'is again stronger than the Ante e¤ect and the KIA e¤ect of top-10 popular names is similar in magnitude to that of the 'Nationalist name'indicator, although it is not precisely estimated in column (2).
We have additionally estimated the speci…cation from column (2) using only top-10 Croatian names, and the Ante coe¢ cient estimated against this narrower benchmark group was again statistically signi…cant (at the 1% level) and similarly large (at 0.0073). When compared to all other speci…c top-10-name coe¢ cients, the Ante coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cantly larger than all but one (Mario). Hence, combining the volunteering and KIA evidence, Ante is the only name that consistently predicts behavior in the war compared to the 'placebo e¤ects'of other popular names. As was the case with the volunteering estimates, the KIA e¤ects are not sensitive to including non-Croatian-name soldiers (in column (3)) and to studying only soldiers from almost-all-Croatian settlements (in column (4)). 33 The Ante coe¢ cient is smaller in column (4), but it remains highly statistically signi…cant and one cannot reject the hypothesis that it is equal to the coe¢ cient in column (1).
Finally, in column (6), we ask whether nationalist names predict KIA risks di¤erently 32 Note that our focus on draftees and the results of the volunteering analysis imply that the Antes drafted in 1991 are likely to be less nationalistic than the average Antes in the population. Hence, the results presented here provide a lower-bound on the e¤ect of being Ante on the chances of being killed in action. 33 We also obtain highly similar e¤ects using the Probit model.
for soldiers who were born in 'siege settlements'. The e¤ect of being named Ante does not di¤er between siege and non-siege settlements. Recall that Antes from 'siege settlements'
were particularly likely to volunteer (see previous section) and so these highly patriotic Antes are under-represented in the draftee sample used in the KIA analysis. On the other hand, those with other nationalist names, for whom being from 'siege settlements'did not increase chances of volunteering, are more likely to be KIA when they come from these locations most a¤ected by the war. We also obtain a puzzling negative siege interaction coe¢ cient for the top-10 Croatian names.
Overall, the pattern of volunteering and KIA estimates is strongly consistent with the hypothesis that nationalist names and Ante in particular provide a signi…cant signal about one's nationalistic values as manifested by volunteering in a war of national independence and dying in the war, which suggests …ghting more valiantly. Nationalistic values (presumably inculcated by parents) linked to WWII history matter in the 1991-1995 war.
The Use of Nationalist Names and War Experiences
A growing literature (see Section 2) suggests that wars have dramatic and long-lasting consequences for political identity. Hence, it is plausible that the War of Independence, when
Croatia was invaded by largely Serbian forces, strengthened nationalistic attitudes in Croatia. In this section we ask whether the 1991-1995 siege (during which civilians su¤ered greatly, see, e.g., Naimark, 2001 ) and the extent of combat operations (proxied by KIA regional concentration) strengthened regional nationalist attitudes. We also explore nationalism patterns related to WWII: The Ustaše dictatorship supported nationalist tendencies by establishing the …rst modern Croatian independent state. However, during WWII, the Ustaše regime murdered hundreds of thousands (Macdonald, 2002) 35 See section 3 for de…nition of the 'siege settlements'and of the three administrative levels of geographic units in Croatia. The major Ustaše-operated concentration-camp locations in Croatia (Jasenovac, Stara Gradiška, Jadovno near Gospić, Slana on Pag, Metajna, Sisak, Koprivnica, Jastrebarsko, Osijek, Ðakovo) are taken from Kraus (1996, p. 90) . 36 We could alternatively denote as high-KIA locations those settlements where the KIA rate is high, but such a set of locations overlaps heavily with the set of mostly small-sized siege settlements.
37 Siege and concentration-camp locations do not signi…cantly overlap: only 0.3% of births occurs in locations that share both features. In contrast, as expected, there is signi…cant overlap between siege and high-KIA locations: 1.5% of births occur in locations sharing both attributes.
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nationalist names across these locations is driven by idiosyncratic location-speci…c factors.
What are the geographic di¤erences across these three sets of locations in the time pattern of popularity of nationalist names, in comparison to the Croatia-wide pattern shown in Figure   3 ? In Section 5, we compared the 1991-1995 war behavior of men with nationalist names to that of men with Croatian (Catholic-calendar) names. We identi…ed 74% percent of soldiers as Croats using their …rst names. The analysis was not sensitive to including all names or controlling for Muslim-and Serbian-name indicators. We classify birth-certi…cate …rst names using the same approach, i.e., as Croatian (Catholic-calendar), Muslim, Serbian, and unidenti…ed-nationality names. There is an important di¤erence, however. While the war-behavior analysis focused on a relatively short time period, the description of name patterns for newborns covers seven decades. Two key processes thus a¤ect the locationspeci…c measurement of nationalist-name popularity:
First, in 'siege settlements', most of which were under Serbian rule for much of the 1991-1995 war, the share of Serbian and Muslim names given to newborns is twice higher during the …ve years preceding the war and more than four times higher during the …rst …ve years after the war when compared to the share during the …ve years of the war. This clearly corresponds to the changing ethnic composition of these locations. 38 Hence, for the purpose of comparing Croatian nationalist-name popularity across locations, we omit from the analysis all newborns with Serbian or Muslim names. 39 Second, across Croatia and also within all three types of locations we consider, the share of (non-Serbian non-Muslim)
names that correspond to the Catholic calendar is declining after 1970. This is related to the increasing popularity of international (English, Italian) names that do not appear on the traditional Catholic Croatian calendar. We inspected this trend across the sets of locations and found it to be highly similar both in size and the time pattern. 40 Since our primary 38 There are no signi…cant changes in the share of Serbian and Muslim names during these time periods in either the high-KIA or the concentration-camp locations. 39 We could not obtain municipality-level nationality shares from the post-independence-war censuses. 40 The decline in the share of Catholic-calendar names between 1970 and 1990 is 15 percentage points in goal is to compare time trends across locations di¤erently a¤ected by war experiences, and since choosing a name for a newborn boy outside of the Croatian calendar corresponds to not using a nationalist name, the analysis presented below is based on using all name types (other than Serbian and Muslim) to calculate the shares of nationalist names on each cohort and birthplace type. After excluding the set of newborns with Muslim and Serbian …rst names, the main features of Figure 3 , which plots the Croatia-wide evolution of the share of nationalist names, are not materially a¤ected. The share of Antes (other nationalist names)
during WWII still peaks at about 2.5% (38%), drops to 1% (15%) around 1970 and rebounds to about 2% (20%) during the War of Independence. Figure 4 shows that in areas where Ustaše-operated concentration camps were located during WWII, the popularity of nationalist names during WWII was comparable to that in the rest of Croatia (shown in Figure 3) . However, the decline in the popularity of these names was steeper than elsewhere in Croatia, and the rise in the popularity of Ante before and during the 1991-1995 war is signi…cantly slower in these areas than elsewhere in Croatia. The share of Antes never rebounds to WWII levels and remains at about half of the Croatia-wide level during 1991-1995. In contrast, in Figure 5 we see a return to WWII-level popularity of Ante in locations where a high share of KIA deaths occurred during the 1991-1995 war.
Here, the spike in Ante popularity during the War of Independence may correspond to the exposure of the population to combat operations. In both sets of locations, the popularity of other nationalist names evolves similarly to the nation-wide pattern. Finally, Figure 6 shows the evolution of the popularity of nationalist names in locations that were under Serbian siege or occupation during the 1991-1995 war; hence, it is natural that the share of Croatian nationalist names there is low during the war. After the war, however, the shares of nationalist names increases dramatically. The share of Antes surpasses WWII levels; both shares are above the Croatia-wide shares of the late 1990s. 41 This pattern likely corresponds in part to declining shares of the Serbian population not captured by our Serbian-and Muslim-name indicator, which limits the use of the siege locations for the analysis of intergenerational transmissions of nationalism (in the next section). Nonetheless, the spike in the prevalence of nationalist names after the War of Independence in these locations is suggestive of the nationalist content of these names. We now turn to the analysis of intergenerational transmission of nationalist names. The time and geographic comparisons provided above suggest that the experience of the 1991-1995 war, when the use of nationalist names was peaking in Croatia, o¤ers an interesting case to study the intergenerational transmission of nationalism. We therefore focus our analysis on nationalist-name transmission during the independence war, i.e., for boys born during 1991 to 1995. This is also the period during which we established the nationalism signal (information content) of nationalist names in Section 5. We again rely on the birth certi…cate data. Since fathers of sons born during 1991-1995 can be expected to have been born before the rapid decline in the use of Catholic names in Croatia, we constrain the set of fathers'names (but not sons'names) to those that appear on the Catholic calendar (mirroring the approach used in Section 5, where we studied men who were adults in 1991).
To assess the extent to which nationalism spreads through intergenerational transmission, we study …rst name choices for sons depending on whether their fathers have a nationalist name. Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) present a simple model of purposeful transmission of political or cultural traits (in the spirit of Bisin and Verdier, 2001) , which predicts that shocks strengthening such traits (including, possibly, the war experiences outlined above) induce increased e¤ort in transmitting one's traits to one's o¤spring. 43 In our case, such increased e¤ort corresponds to a higher probability of giving one's son a nationalist name, Ante or other. Based on the name use analysis provided above, we contrast transmission rates for the (opposite) shocks corresponding to the high-KIA and concentration-camp areas.
Further, the Bisin and Verdier (2001) model allows values to be transmitted either directly from parents to o¤spring or 'obliquely'by o¤spring interacting with society outside the family.
It predicts that there is substitution between intergenerational transmission of cultural or political traits and the oblique transmission from society at large: nationalist fathers may invest less in inculcating nationalist values (may be less likely to transmit a nationalist name)
if there is a strong chance that those values will be passed on by a local society where they are widespread. Under strong substitution, i.e., if direct transmission of nationalism decreases as the prevalence of the nationalist trait in the local population grows, nationalism would not be completely absent or completely prevalent in any location. We thus test whether the Ante-Ante (nationalist-nationalist) transmission is weaker for fathers with nationalist names in locations where the prevalence of nationalist names is stronger. 44 An alternative, simpler, explanation for nationalist-name geographic patterns is that name choices of all parents (nationalist or not) co-move with regional trends of name popularity driven by cultural or political factors, including the two wars we observe. 44 We are not primarily interested in comparing the Ante-Ante rate to other same-name transmission rates; rather, we study geographic di¤erences in the evolution of the nationalist-nationalist and non-nationalistnationalist rates. For the high-KIA locations, we detect no di¤erence in nationalist naming patters.
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In the bottom panel of the Table, we 47 See section 3 for de…nition of the 555 municipalities/cities. There is much variability in the way (historical) addresses (places of birth) are recorded on birth certi…cates, but we are able to match most of the birth records to one of the Croatian municipalities or cities. The match rate is over 90% for cohorts born after 1990, but it is below 50% prior to 1950. 48 However, within each group of locations, the share ranges from about 10% to about 40%. 49 Note that our use of the population of births to measure the share of nationalist names in an area eliminates measurement error bias that is likely present in studies, such as Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) , that rely on shares estimated o¤ survey data.
nationalist names when they reside in an area (a) a¤ected by long-lived memory of WWII atrocities related to the history of nationalism, and (b) where nationalism is prevalent in the regional society at large. However, for fathers who are less nationalist as implied by our name proxy, we …nd that they use the name Ante in tandem with the overall popularity of the name in their region and that they do not behave di¤erently depending on the historical experience of their region. The results in column (3) and (4), which study the broad group of nationalist names (including Ante), are consistent with most of these fathers not recognizing the family vs. society (oblique) transmission trade-o¤ and following the general area-speci…c name-popularity trends when choosing their sons' names. 50 The three positive coe¢ cients corresponding to pre-war shares of nationalist names are similar in magnitude; under our interpretation of nationalist name choices, they imply that during the war, i.e. during a spike in nationalism, the regional structure of nationalism reinforced itself.
In sum, the long-view descriptive evidence provided above suggests that Ante is a name whose use is particularly sensitive to war experiences. The regression evidence in Table 3 focusing on the War of Independence, i.e., on a particularly dramatic episode when a nation's territorial integrity is at stake, is consistent with Ante fathers having nationalist views, being 
Supplementary Analyses
Our preceding analysis of intergenerational transmission of nationalism was conducted in absence of direct evidence on parenting choices of fathers with nationalist names and those of other fathers. which is selected on having been at least partially disabled during the war, also allows us to ask whether veteran father-son name transitions align qualitatively with our main …ndings.
The answer is that they do. First, we …nd that volunteers named Ante who have at least one son born before the war are 5 percentage points (statistically signi…cantly) more likely to have named (one of) their son(s) born before the war Ante, but there is no such relationship present for the draftees. This is consistent with volunteer (but not draftee) Ante fathers considering their name as an expression (symbol) of their nationalist beliefs. We obtain similar results for the transmission of any nationalist name. Next, for fathers who did not die during the war and whose sons were born during or after the war, the higher the exposure to carnage in their unit measured using the share of their unit that was killed in the war, the lower the probability of transmitting both Ante and the other nationalist names to their sons; the e¤ects are stronger among volunteers. 56 While these results are at most tentative, due to the selected nature of the sample, we …nd them tantalizing. Future research could employ our approach for identifying political values and the intergenerational transmission thereof for random samples of veterans or civilians di¤erentially exposed to violent con ‡icts. 55 See Kovaµ c (2016) for more details on this data. 56 All of these results are available upon request.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrate that, at least in the Croatian case, names predict behavior in a life-and-death situation-in a war for national independence. We thus show that …rst names can carry an informative signal about nationalism (patriotism) and that they can be used to study the spread of such values through history and geography, and, potentially, as input into the study of ethnic and civil con ‡icts (e.g., Novta, in press). It could be that our approach is mainly useful in countries that feature a sharply divided ethnic mix and in federative countries where national identity can a¤ect many dimensions of one's life. Our approach could also be particularly useful in periods of heightened nationalist tensions and in war-like situations where leader's names are notoriously associated with their actions and political beliefs. Given the existence of birth certi…cate records in most countries, our approach allows for the study of the intergenerational transmission of name-related cultural, political, and ethnic-identity values in various historical settings. Our …ndings thus open promising avenues for future research; for instance, if one …nds that the use of names corresponding to leaders of Nazi Germany is over-represented among supporters of right-wing parties in post-WWII Germany, one could use easily accessible name statistics to map the evolution of such values over populations not covered by survey data directly eliciting such values. Similarly, using our approach, one could explore the information content and the prevalence of …rst-name choices corresponding to prominent generals of the US civil war, to di¤erentiate Ukrainian and Russian versions of several …rst names in Ukraine during its con ‡ict with Russia, or, to return to the former Yugoslavia, to measure the prevalence of Chetnik …rst names in Serbia.
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Based on the insight that names serve as a proxy for holding nationalist values, we study the evolution of nationalism in Croatia and its transfer from fathers to sons. The use of nationalist names that were popular in Croatia during WWII rebounds starting in the 1970s
and peaks during the 1991-1995 War of Independence. We contrast these naming patterns 57 Chetniks ( µ Cetniki) were members of a Serbian nationalist guerrilla force responsible for mass civilian murder during WWII.
across Croatian locations exposed to dramatic events, which are likely to establish shocks to nationalist attitudes. Speci…cally, we study the e¤ects of the presence of concentration camps during WWII and of high KIA rates and long-term siege by enemy forces during the War of Independence. These e¤ects are of interest in their own right and they also illustrate the usefulness of our approach for identifying factors that a¤ect the intergenerational transmission of political values. In concentration-camp locations, the popularity of names synonymous with extensive crimes against humanity during WWII increases during the War of Independence, but substantially less so than in the rest of the country. In contrast, the use of nationalist names reaches WWII levels immediately after Croatian control is re One view of the Yugoslav wars is that after years of peaceful coexistence, violence erupted 58 Our analysis of the nationalist name patterns after the War of Independence may be suggestive of the approach taken by the Croatian society towards understanding the war. Rivera (2008) implies that the Croatian state has dealt with the war memory through cultural re-framing rather than through public acknowledgment.
